Game theoretical analysis of leadership structure for supply chains involving risky supplier

Takuya Tsuboi, Tatsushi Nishi

研究成果

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Supply chain risk management is one of significant issues in the design and operations of supply chains. It is wellknown that leader-follower relationship influences the decision making of decentralized supply chains. In this paper, we address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure in the decentralized supply chain with risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of the supply product for the ordered product according to the probability of supplier availability. The equilibrium solution is analytically derived for a single supplier, a single risky supplier and a single retailer. The influence of the probability of risky supplier availability to the optimal leadership structure is investigated. Numerical examples are provided to show the validity of the proposed game theoretical analysis.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2017
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ2903-2908
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9781538616451
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 11月 27 2017
外部発表はい
イベント2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2017 - Banff
継続期間: 10月 5 201710月 8 2017

出版物シリーズ

名前2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2017
2017-January

Conference

Conference2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2017
国/地域Canada
CityBanff
Period10/5/1710/8/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 人工知能
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用
  • 人間とコンピュータの相互作用
  • 制御と最適化

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