Trade policies as signals of private political pressure

Hisashi Sawaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The situation of a home government facing political pressure from an exporting industry within its jurisdiction is considered. If a foreign government cannot directly observe such pressure, the home government has an incentive to understate it to induce foreign tariff reductions. In equilibrium, the home government will distort its first-period trade policy in a direction that the industry does not prefer (i.e. raising the export tax or reducing the export subsidy) in order to reveal the true pressure, as compared with a policy selected under complete information.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)878-889
Number of pages12
JournalReview of International Economics
Volume15
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2007
Externally publishedYes

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trade policy
industry
taxes
subsidy
jurisdiction
incentive

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Development

Cite this

Trade policies as signals of private political pressure. / Sawaki, Hisashi.

In: Review of International Economics, Vol. 15, No. 5, 11.2007, p. 878-889.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sawaki, Hisashi. / Trade policies as signals of private political pressure. In: Review of International Economics. 2007 ; Vol. 15, No. 5. pp. 878-889.
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