The economic costs of court decisions concerning dismissals in Japan: Identification by judge transfers

Hiroko Okudaira

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Despite its significant influence on the actual enforcement of the law, the economic cost of court discretion has generally been ignored in the literature on employment protection. This paper exploits a distinctive feature of the Japanese judicial system, periodic judge transfers, to identify court discretion. Because judges move across local labor markets, while a single national court system ensures that there are no legal boundaries between regions, it is possible to remove any confounding relationships between current litigation outcomes and local labor markets. A key finding is that an increase in the worker victory ratio in adjustment dismissal litigations reduces the rates of both job creation and destruction. Ignoring the uncertainty inherent in court decisions would lead to misspecification of the actual cost of employment protection, especially in countries with high judicial activism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)60-75
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Volume53
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

Keywords

  • Employment protection
  • Judge effect
  • Law enforcement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

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