TY - GEN
T1 - On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks
AU - Iokibe, Kengo
AU - Amano, Tetsuo
AU - Toyota, Yoshitaka
PY - 2011/10/24
Y1 - 2011/10/24
N2 - One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.
AB - One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.
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U2 - 10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
DO - 10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:80054752843
SN - 9781424447831
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
SP - 925
EP - 930
BT - EMC 2011 - Proceedings
T2 - 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011
Y2 - 14 August 2011 through 19 August 2011
ER -