Abstract
One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility |
| Pages | 925-930 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
| Event | 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 - Long Beach, CA, United States Duration: Aug 14 2011 → Aug 19 2011 |
Other
| Other | 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Long Beach, CA |
| Period | 8/14/11 → 8/19/11 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Condensed Matter Physics
Cite this
On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. / Iokibe, Kengo; Amano, Tetsuo; Toyota, Yoshitaka.
IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility. 2011. p. 925-930 6038441.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks
AU - Iokibe, Kengo
AU - Amano, Tetsuo
AU - Toyota, Yoshitaka
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.
AB - One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80054752843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=80054752843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
DO - 10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:80054752843
SN - 9781424447831
SP - 925
EP - 930
BT - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
ER -