On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of PI/EMC design techniques, on-board decoupling, was proved its possibility to be used as a countermeasure against cryptographic side-channel analysis attack. The on-board decoupling was applied to a side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBO-G) involving a cryptographic FPGA that operated an AES-128 encryption process. Two decoupling conditions were examined. Radio frequency (RF) power current was detected with a current probe that was placed on a power cable connected to SASEBO-G for the cryptographic FPGA. Traces of the RF power current were recorded repeatedly with a digital oscilloscope until 30,000 traces were acquired in each decoupling condition. The traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA). Results of CPA show that necessary number of traces to reveal the secret key significantly increased when the RF power current was attenuated by decoupling over the dominant frequency range in spectra of the RF power current. The decoupling technique can be useful as a countermeasure of side-channel analysis attacks to cryptographic modules.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Pages925-930
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011 - Long Beach, CA, United States
Duration: Aug 14 2011Aug 19 2011

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011
CountryUnited States
CityLong Beach, CA
Period8/14/118/19/11

Fingerprint

decoupling
attack
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGA)
radio frequencies
countermeasures
Electromagnetic compatibility
Cryptography
Cables
oscilloscopes
cables
Side channel attack
modules
frequency ranges
evaluation
probes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this

Iokibe, K., Amano, T., & Toyota, Y. (2011). On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. In IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (pp. 925-930). [6038441] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441

On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. / Iokibe, Kengo; Amano, Tetsuo; Toyota, Yoshitaka.

IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility. 2011. p. 925-930 6038441.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Iokibe, K, Amano, T & Toyota, Y 2011, On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. in IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility., 6038441, pp. 925-930, 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2011, Long Beach, CA, United States, 8/14/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
Iokibe K, Amano T, Toyota Y. On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. In IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility. 2011. p. 925-930. 6038441 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2011.6038441
Iokibe, Kengo ; Amano, Tetsuo ; Toyota, Yoshitaka. / On-board decoupling of cryptographic FPGA to improve tolerance to side-channel attacks. IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility. 2011. pp. 925-930
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