Abstract
This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in either a moderate or an extreme direction.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 48-68 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
Keywords
- Election
- ideology
- private information
- signaling
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
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Cite this
Sawaki, H. (2017). Ideology signaling in electoral politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 29(1), 48-68. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630429