Ideology signaling in electoral politics

Hisashi Sawaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in either a moderate or an extreme direction.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-68
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017


  • Election
  • ideology
  • private information
  • signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


Dive into the research topics of 'Ideology signaling in electoral politics'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this