Ideology signaling in electoral politics

Hisashi Sawaki

doi:10.1177/0951629816630429

Ideology signaling in electoral politics

Hisashi Sawaki

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in either a moderate or an extreme direction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	48-68
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Theoretical Politics
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630429
Publication status	Published - Jan 1 2017

Keywords

Election
ideology
private information
signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science

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