Ideology signaling in electoral politics

Hisashi Sawaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in either a moderate or an extreme direction.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-68
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017

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Keywords

  • Election
  • ideology
  • private information
  • signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Ideology signaling in electoral politics. / Sawaki, Hisashi.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, 01.01.2017, p. 48-68.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sawaki, Hisashi. / Ideology signaling in electoral politics. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2017 ; Vol. 29, No. 1. pp. 48-68.
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