Abstract
This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealings with potential downstream competition. Unlike in previous studies, the incumbent can establish a direct retailer with some fixed payment and can offer an exclusive contract to a downstream buyer twice. We show that the existence of these two options helps the incumbent deter socially efficient entry and earn almost monopoly profits even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 47-60 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 1 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Direct retailers
- Exclusive dealing
- Two offers
- Vertical relation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer. / Kitamura, Hiroshi; Sato, Misato; Arai, Koki.
In: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol. 112, No. 1, 01.05.2014, p. 47-60.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer
AU - Kitamura, Hiroshi
AU - Sato, Misato
AU - Arai, Koki
PY - 2014/5/1
Y1 - 2014/5/1
N2 - This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealings with potential downstream competition. Unlike in previous studies, the incumbent can establish a direct retailer with some fixed payment and can offer an exclusive contract to a downstream buyer twice. We show that the existence of these two options helps the incumbent deter socially efficient entry and earn almost monopoly profits even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition.
AB - This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealings with potential downstream competition. Unlike in previous studies, the incumbent can establish a direct retailer with some fixed payment and can offer an exclusive contract to a downstream buyer twice. We show that the existence of these two options helps the incumbent deter socially efficient entry and earn almost monopoly profits even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition.
KW - Direct retailers
KW - Exclusive dealing
KW - Two offers
KW - Vertical relation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84957441242&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84957441242&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00712-013-0335-7
DO - 10.1007/s00712-013-0335-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84957441242
VL - 112
SP - 47
EP - 60
JO - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
JF - Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
SN - 0931-8658
IS - 1
ER -