Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-3
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume151
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Exclusive contracts
Bargaining power
Suppliers
Nash bargaining
Incumbents
Buyers

Keywords

  • Antitrust policy
  • Entry deterrence
  • Exclusive contracts
  • Nash bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Exclusive contracts and bargaining power. / Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 151, 01.02.2017, p. 1-3.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kitamura, Hiroshi ; Matsushima, Noriaki ; Sato, Misato. / Exclusive contracts and bargaining power. In: Economics Letters. 2017 ; Vol. 151. pp. 1-3.
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