Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-3
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume151
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 1 2017

Keywords

  • Antitrust policy
  • Entry deterrence
  • Exclusive contracts
  • Nash bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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