Educating voters for protection

Hisashi Sawaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)906-921
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of International Trade and Economic Development
Volume24
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 3 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

campaign
trade policy
farmer
election
expenditure
pressure group
Industry
publicity
industry
expenditures
modeling
externality
Group
goods

Keywords

  • externalities
  • publicity campaign
  • signaling
  • trade policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Development
  • Aerospace Engineering

Cite this

Educating voters for protection. / Sawaki, Hisashi.

In: Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Vol. 24, No. 7, 03.10.2015, p. 906-921.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sawaki, Hisashi. / Educating voters for protection. In: Journal of International Trade and Economic Development. 2015 ; Vol. 24, No. 7. pp. 906-921.
@article{8315e306193a454888aa1ce7ecd7889a,
title = "Educating voters for protection",
abstract = "This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense.",
keywords = "externalities, publicity campaign, signaling, trade policy",
author = "Hisashi Sawaki",
year = "2015",
month = "10",
day = "3",
doi = "10.1080/09638199.2014.926385",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "906--921",
journal = "Journal of International Trade and Economic Development",
issn = "0963-8199",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "7",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Educating voters for protection

AU - Sawaki, Hisashi

PY - 2015/10/3

Y1 - 2015/10/3

N2 - This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense.

AB - This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense.

KW - externalities

KW - publicity campaign

KW - signaling

KW - trade policy

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84937251441&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84937251441&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/09638199.2014.926385

DO - 10.1080/09638199.2014.926385

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84937251441

VL - 24

SP - 906

EP - 921

JO - Journal of International Trade and Economic Development

JF - Journal of International Trade and Economic Development

SN - 0963-8199

IS - 7

ER -