Demystifying Roman Ingarden’s Purely Intentional Objects of Perception

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to eliminate a seeming redundancy in Roman Ingarden’s theory of perceptual intentionality and, through this, provide a modest and partial defense of his theory. I shall first argue that, contrary to an impression one might initially have, Ingarden’s notion of purely intentional objects of perception is not superfluous; purely intentional objects of perception play a role as representational contents. Second, I shall point out that Ingarden’s theory has some merits that prove it to be worthy of serious and closer consideration for us today.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions To Phenomenology
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages139-162
Number of pages24
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameContributions To Phenomenology
Volume101
ISSN (Print)0923-9545
ISSN (Electronic)2215-1915

Keywords

  • Ingarden
  • Intentional objects
  • Intentionality
  • Perceptual experience
  • Representational contents

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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