Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of "SIMON."As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that "SIMON"can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages412-415
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781665428354
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Event9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021 - Virtual, Online, Japan
Duration: Nov 23 2021Nov 26 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2021 9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021

Conference

Conference9th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2021
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityVirtual, Online
Period11/23/2111/26/21

Keywords

  • information security
  • lightweight cipher
  • side-channel attack
  • SIMON

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Software

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