Analysis of side-channel information leaking behavior in cryptographic circuit using internal current source

Kengo Iokibe, Nobuhiro Tai, Hiroto Kagotani, Hiroyuki Onishi, Yoshitaka Toyota, Tetsushi Watanabe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Cryptographic circuits were analyzed regarding their side-channel information leaking behavior based on internal current source. Cryptographic circuits were implemented in an FPGA with registers arranged to demonstrate three known side-channel information leaking behaviors; (1) leakage is reduced by making Hamming distance (HD) at registers constant, (2)leakage increases with signal-to-noise ratio of side-channel traces, and (3) unbalance of routing path from registers to load circuits produces leakage. The implemented circuits were measured in terms of voltage fluctuation in the power distribution network for FPGA core circuit where the circuits were implemented. The measured voltage fluctuations were converted into internal current sources that were exploited to analyze the information leaking behavior by applying a side-channel analysis, correlation power analysis (CPA). The analysis confirmed that internal current source clearly demonstrated the side-channel information leaking behaviors. This results suggests that internal current source would allow to understand what parts of encryption circuits largely contribute to leak information and how to develop an efficient and low-cost countermeasure against side-channel attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)365-371
Number of pages7
JournalIEEJ Transactions on Fundamentals and Materials
Volume136
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Networks (circuits)
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGA)
Hamming distance
Electric potential
Electric power distribution
Cryptography
Signal to noise ratio
Costs

Keywords

  • Correlation power analysis
  • Cryptographic security
  • Electromagnetic compatibility
  • Equivalent circuit
  • Side-channel attack
  • Switching current

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Analysis of side-channel information leaking behavior in cryptographic circuit using internal current source. / Iokibe, Kengo; Tai, Nobuhiro; Kagotani, Hiroto; Onishi, Hiroyuki; Toyota, Yoshitaka; Watanabe, Tetsushi.

In: IEEJ Transactions on Fundamentals and Materials, Vol. 136, No. 6, 2016, p. 365-371.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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