TY - GEN
T1 - An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain
AU - Liu, Ziang
AU - Nishi, Tatsushi
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank the funding provided by JSPS KAKENHI 18H03826
PY - 2019/12
Y1 - 2019/12
N2 - An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.
AB - An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.
KW - Closed-loop supply chain
KW - Stackelberg equilibrium
KW - replicator dynamics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85079611751&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741
DO - 10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85079611751
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
SP - 896
EP - 900
BT - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019
Y2 - 15 December 2019 through 18 December 2019
ER -