An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Ziang Liu; Tatsushi Nishi

doi:10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741

An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Ziang Liu, Tatsushi Nishi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	896-900
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728138046
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741
Publication status	Published - Dec 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019 - Macao, Macao Duration: Dec 15 2019 → Dec 18 2019

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
ISSN (Print)	2157-3611
ISSN (Electronic)	2157-362X

Conference

Conference	2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019
Country/Territory	Macao
City	Macao
Period	12/15/19 → 12/18/19

Keywords

Closed-loop supply chain
Stackelberg equilibrium
replicator dynamics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741

Cite this

An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain. / Liu, Ziang ; Nishi, Tatsushi.

2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019. IEEE Computer Society, 2019. p. 896-900 8978741 (IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Liu, Z & Nishi, T 2019, An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain. in 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019., 8978741, IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 896-900, 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019, Macao, Macao, 12/15/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741

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title = "An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain",

abstract = "An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.",

keywords = "Closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg equilibrium, replicator dynamics",

author = "Ziang Liu and Tatsushi Nishi",

note = "Funding Information: The authors would like to thank the funding provided by JSPS KAKENHI 18H03826 Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IEEE.; 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2019 ; Conference date: 15-12-2019 Through 18-12-2019",

year = "2019",

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doi = "10.1109/IEEM44572.2019.8978741",

language = "English",

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AU - Nishi, Tatsushi

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N2 - An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.

AB - An evolutionary game model is investigated to study the stability conditions for four different reverse channel structures in the closed-loop supply chain. The proper channel structures are analyzed for the given conditions. We consider one centrally coordinated model and three decentralized models that consist of manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and third-party collection model. The profit function is maximized for the centralized model and Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained for the other three decentralized models. Using the optimal profit functions, an evolutionary game model is proposed. On the basis of the stable conditions, we propose a profit sharing allocation method that can make the centralized supply chain model stable from a long-term view. Also, several numerical experiments are conducted. The results show that the coordinated channel structure is preferable over other structures with a proper profit sharing allocation method.

KW - Closed-loop supply chain

KW - Stackelberg equilibrium

KW - replicator dynamics

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An Evolutionary Game Model in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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