Abstract
Since Maynard Smith and Price proposed the earliest version of Hawk–Dove (HD) game, it attracted researchers’ attention as one of models of conflict for two players in game theory. In conflict game, the players’ benefit depends on the strategy of opponent for each other. In the classical spatial HD games, if one player adopts defector strategy, it tends to get high payoffs, and therefore increases population of the same strategy, which resulting in an extinction of cooperators. Several studies tried to solve the problem of an extinction of cooperator in spatial HD game. In this paper, we developed a novel spatial HD model replacing the best takes over update rule with different one, and investigated the effect of modifying update rules on the problem of collaborators extinction in space HD games. We found that our model generated characteristic population patterns and represented the survival of cooperators compared with the classical spatial HD model in which the updated rule was fixed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 59-62 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Chaos, Solitons and Fractals |
| Volume | 121 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 1 2019 |
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Keywords
- Cooperation
- Phase transition
- Spatial Hawk–Dove game
- Territory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Mathematics(all)
Cite this
An adaptive replacement of the rule update triggers the cooperative evolution in the Hawk–Dove game. / Sakiyama, Tomoko; Arizono, Ikuo.
In: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, Vol. 121, 01.04.2019, p. 59-62.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - An adaptive replacement of the rule update triggers the cooperative evolution in the Hawk–Dove game
AU - Sakiyama, Tomoko
AU - Arizono, Ikuo
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - Since Maynard Smith and Price proposed the earliest version of Hawk–Dove (HD) game, it attracted researchers’ attention as one of models of conflict for two players in game theory. In conflict game, the players’ benefit depends on the strategy of opponent for each other. In the classical spatial HD games, if one player adopts defector strategy, it tends to get high payoffs, and therefore increases population of the same strategy, which resulting in an extinction of cooperators. Several studies tried to solve the problem of an extinction of cooperator in spatial HD game. In this paper, we developed a novel spatial HD model replacing the best takes over update rule with different one, and investigated the effect of modifying update rules on the problem of collaborators extinction in space HD games. We found that our model generated characteristic population patterns and represented the survival of cooperators compared with the classical spatial HD model in which the updated rule was fixed.
AB - Since Maynard Smith and Price proposed the earliest version of Hawk–Dove (HD) game, it attracted researchers’ attention as one of models of conflict for two players in game theory. In conflict game, the players’ benefit depends on the strategy of opponent for each other. In the classical spatial HD games, if one player adopts defector strategy, it tends to get high payoffs, and therefore increases population of the same strategy, which resulting in an extinction of cooperators. Several studies tried to solve the problem of an extinction of cooperator in spatial HD game. In this paper, we developed a novel spatial HD model replacing the best takes over update rule with different one, and investigated the effect of modifying update rules on the problem of collaborators extinction in space HD games. We found that our model generated characteristic population patterns and represented the survival of cooperators compared with the classical spatial HD model in which the updated rule was fixed.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Phase transition
KW - Spatial Hawk–Dove game
KW - Territory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062085927&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85062085927&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.chaos.2019.01.014
DO - 10.1016/j.chaos.2019.01.014
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85062085927
VL - 121
SP - 59
EP - 62
JO - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals
JF - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals
SN - 0960-0779
ER -