A proposal of bargaining solution for cooperative contract in a supply chain

Wakana Kato, Ikuo Arizono, Yasuhiko Takemoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As a problem in supply chain management, the decision problem of terms and conditions of a contract between a supplier and a retailer is recognized commonly. The concept of cooperative bargaining between a supplier and a retailer is the key concepts to resolve this problem in the supply chain. Then, the bargaining evaluation function by Nash in the game theory exists as a tool to obtain the solution by cooperation bargaining. The Nash bargaining solution is derived under the premise that a power balance between a supplier and a retailer is equal. However, the situation where the power balance between a supplier and a retailer in actual bargaining is not equal is supposed frequently. For the purpose of reflecting the power balance in obtaining the bargaining solution, the concept of a general bargaining solution was proposed and then the general bargaining evaluation function for obtaining the general bargaining solution was devised. However, in the case of adopting the general bargaining evaluation function as a bargaining tool, some problems are included. In this article, we address the problems in the general bargaining solution. Then, we propose a new concept of bargaining process to obtain a solution under considering the existence of power balance between a supplier and a retailer.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)559-567
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Intelligent Manufacturing
Volume29
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2018

Keywords

  • Cooperative game theory
  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Supply chain management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Artificial Intelligence

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